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Proving Disabling Pain in Social Security Disability
Proceedings: The Social Security Administration and
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Social Security disability benefits provided under Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act' have been described by the Special
Committee on Aging of the United States Senate as an important
part of the "safety net" protecting citizens who are unable to support themselves.2 These benefits are designed to protect disabled
workers who are insured within the requirements of the Act and
who have not yet reached the age of 65 s if these workers are under
disabilities which render them unable to engage in any "kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.",
In contrast to the old age and survivors insurance trust fund, the
disability insurance trust fund is considered to be financially
sound.' However, this program currently faces its own intractable
problems. There has been a widespread perception that, in the
past, lax administration of the program has allowed large numbers
of persons who did not meet the statutory definition of "disability"' to receive disability insurance benefits, and has allowed persons to continue receiving benefits after their disabilities have
* The author wishes to thank Martin Singer of the Pittsburgh law firm of McArdle,
Caroselli, Spagnolli & Beachler for his helpful comments and suggestions, as well as for
providing some of the materials used in this comment.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383c (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Title XVI of the Social
Security Act provides for a program of "Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind
and Disabled" to be administered by the Social Security Administration under the same
claims processing procedures as the previously existing Title II program, entitled "Federal
Old-Age Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits," 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). Citations throughout this comment will be to the sections of the statute and
Social Security Regulations applicable to Title II disability claims. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-404.1598 (1983).
2. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE iii (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING].

3.
4.
5.
6.
of what

42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (B).(1976).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976).
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 2, at iii.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1976). See infra note 28 for the text of the statutory definition
constitutes a "disability."

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 22:491

ceased.7 The Social Security Administration has also come under
attack for failing to adequately serve disabled claimants and beneficiaries, for providing an inadequate adjudicatory process by
which claimants may assert and defend their rights to benefits, and
for failing to manage the adjudication of claims so as to produce
predictable and consistent results.' As a result of congressional
concerns about a large backlog of cases awaiting review and the
resulting poor administration of the disability insurance programs, 9
the 1980 amendments to the Social Security Act were enacted.10 As
thus amended, the Social Security Act contemplates a greatly
strengthened federal management of the disability program, as op11 with a view towards inposed to the role of the state agencies,
12
creasing the uniformity of decisions.
7. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 2, at iii.
8. See, e.g., Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 DuKE L.J. 181, 181-83.
9. S. REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1334 (1980).
10. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 453456, 460 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 405, 421, 423 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
11. At the inception of the disability program, Congress decided that initial disability
determinations should be made by state vocational rehabilitation agencies, and applications
are still normally referred to these agencies after they are filed at a district office of the
Social Security Administration. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CH. L. REV. 28, 32-33 n.17 (1976). However, under certain circumstances, initial disability determinations will be made by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, rather than the state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a), (b) (Supp. V 1981).
If the claim is denied by the state agency, the claimant is entitled first to a reconsideration by the state agency, and then to a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge
appointed under the federal Administrative Procedure Act. If the claimant is still unsuccessful, he may request review by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration. Finally, he may seek judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp V 1981). These
procedures are outlined in Mashaw, supra, at 32-33. See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-404.995
(1983).
12. For example, under the Social Security Act as amended, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (hereinafter the Secretary) is required to promulgate regulations specifying performance standards and administrative requirements and procedures to be followed by the states in performing the disability determination function. 42 U.S.C. §
421(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The Secretary is also authorized to review state agency determinations and administrative law judges' decisions on his own motion, 42 U.S.C. § 421(c)(1)
(Supp. V 1981), and is required to review specified percentages of all determinations made
by state agencies before any action is taken to implement the determination; that is, before
any benefits are paid. 42 U.S.C. § 421(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981). In addition, the Secretary is
required to review the status of persons already receiving benefits whose status had not
been determined to be permanent at least once every three years, for the purpose of determining continuing eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 421(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981). However, because of the
pressures imposed on the state agencies by the vastly increased number of reviews under
this latter requirement, the Social Security Act was again amended in 1982 to permit the
Secretary to waive it, and reduce the number of cases sent to the state agencies for re-
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The result of the 1980 amendments has been, and will apparently continue to be, to make it more difficult for persons alleging
that they suffer from some disabling impairment to obtain disability insurance benefits. The Social Security Administration's efforts
to tighten up the management of the program have reached the
point where seventy percent of the initial applications are denied
at the state agency level.1" Furthermore, about forty-five percent of
those beneficiaries whose cases are reviewed for continuing eligibility are currently having their benefits terminated. 14 Although
many disabled persons who have received denials or terminations
have, on appeal, had benefits awarded to them by the administrative law judges,' 5 successful appeals are becoming rarer. In addition to demanding that its administrative law judges adhere to a
policy of "non-acquiescence" in court decisions which contradict
its policies as to what constitutes a "disability" within the meaning
of the Social Security Act,' 6 the Social Security Administration has
attempted to improve the judges' performance by instituting production standards, a peer review system, and a quality assurance
program.17 These efforts have been seen by administrative law
judges as threatening their judicial independence, and consequently, the right of disability claimants to a fair hearing.18
The controversy presently surrounding the disability insurance
program is bound to affect the administration of the program, esexamination. Virgin Islands Source Income-Social Security Benefit Appeals, Pub. L. No.
97-455, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 96 Stat. 2499, 2500 to be codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 421(h)(2), (3).
13. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 2, at iii-iv.
14. Id. at iv.
15. See supra note 11 as to the role of administrative law judges in the disability
determination process. It should be noted here that disability benefit recipients have no
constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of their benefits
under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Furthermore, on an appeal by the terminated claimant, the Secretary may reweigh the evidence considered at the earlier proceeding, and reach a different determination on the basis of evidence that the impairment was
less serious than originally thought, or that there had been a medical improvement. Weber
v. Harris, 640 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1981). But cf. Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.
1982); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1973) (a prior ruling of disability can give rise to a presumption that the disability still exists, absent proof to the contrary).
16. See infra notes 166-180 and accompanying text.
17. Simon, For ALJs, Obscurity Is Ending, NAT'L L. J., June 6, 1983, at 21, col. 1.
18. See, e.g., Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court held that
the plaintiff, an administrative law judge in the Social Security Administration's Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals, presented a justiciable controversy and had standing to bring suit
alleging an invasion of his statutory right of decisional independence by Social Security
Administration management policies.
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pecially since proving the existence of a "disability" within the
statutory definition"9 is such an inherently subjective, individualized procedure. This is, of course, especially true when the impairment alleged is a disabling degree of subjectively felt pain. In fact,
the Social Security Administration's ability to accurately adjudicate this issue has already been severely affected, mostly at the
expense of large numbers of truly disabled persons whose applications for disability benefits have been denied in recent years, or
whose benefits have been terminated.2 0 Many of these persons,
whose disability benefits were often their sole source of income,
have lost their homes and cars, deteriorated physically due to lack
of medical attention, or even committed suicide.2" Some have died
as a result of the very illnesses which had been determined to be
not disabling, sometimes shortly after the determination was
made. 2 The disability program has been thrown into chaos, as
Senator Levin recently indicated 23 in introducing reform legislation
which would, among other things, require a showing of medical improvement before a claimant's benefits are terminated 24 and
amend the Social Security Act by including a definition of
",pain.,,25
This comment will explore the conflict between the policies of
the Social Security Administration and the decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding determinations as to the issue of when subjectively-felt pain experienced by a
particular disability benefits claimant is disabling within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Although references will be made to
decisions of other federal courts, it is submitted that the decisions
of the Third Circuit are representative, 6 and may be taken as a
19. See infra note 28.
20. 129 CONG. REC. S1146-47 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1983) (statement of Sen. Levin).
21. Id. at S1145.
22. Newsday, March 22, 1983, at R 15 (reprint).
23. 129 CONG. REC. S1147 (daily ed. Feb. 15 1983) (remarks of Sen Levin).
24. S. 476, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 81146-52 (1983).
25. Id. See infra note 180.
26. For example, it is well-settled in a majority of the courts of appeals that, as a
general proposition, a claimant's testimony concerning subjective pain may serve as the basis for establishing disability even in the absence of supporting clinical or objective medical
findings, since such pain may still be so real and intense to the claimant as to be disabling.
See, e.g., Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Benson v. Schweiker, 652
F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1981); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1980); Marcus v. Califano,
615 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1979); Northcutt v. Califano, 581 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1978); Stark v.
Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974); Bittel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir.
1971); Branham v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1967); Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289
(9th Cir. 1965).
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starting point. The general issue discussed will be the legitimacy of
the Social Security Administration's application of the statutory
definition of disability, particularly by its promulgation and application of regulations, to cases in which an impairment is alleged
due to subjectively-felt disabling pain. The Administration's performance will be measured against judicial interpretations of the
Social Security Act's definition of "disability," with a due regard
for the fact that much of the difference between the two is probably inevitable, as a result of the difference in institutional perspectives. That is, the Administration, which is responsible for running
a large program, will necessarily favor an approach to disability issues which emphasizes the need for consistent adjudications and
makes it difficult to qualify for benefits on such a subjective basis
as disabling pain. The courts, on the other hand, frequently faced
with sympathy-arousing individual claimants, are much more
likely to grant benefits on the basis of subjectively-felt pain despite
the dangers to uniform decision-making.
II.

THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT'S DEFINITION OF DISABILITY

The Social Security Act's definition of what constitutes a "disability" for which disability insurance benefits may be paid2 8 lacks
27. See Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 845
(1976). Though recognizing the inevitability of this difference in institutional perspectives,
this author confesses to an opinion that the Social Security Administration too often forgets
that the beneficient purposes of the Social Security Act require that a liberal, tolerant standard be applied in disability proceedings. Hess v. Secretary of HEW, 497 F.2d 837, 840 (3d
Cir. 1974).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)-(3) (1976) provides in relevant part that:
(d)(1) The term "disability" means(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)(A) an individual.., shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy ....
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.
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specificity and is of little help in determining when, or even
whether, subjective complaints of pain may serve as the basis for
determining that a claimant is disabled. The statutory language
tends to focus on the effects of a medical condition concerning a
claimant's ability to perform work activity, rather than on the
medical condition itself. For example, the Social Security Act's basic definition of "disability," found in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1),19 simply provides that a disability exists when a claimant cannot perform "any substantial gainful activity" as a result of "any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment."3 0 Likewise, in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A), the Act refers to the "severity" of
a physical or medical impairment, but measures such severity in
terms of the claimant's ability to perform either his previous work
or other work existing in the national economy, rather than in
medical terminology. 3 It should also be noted that nothing in the
language of 42 U.S.C.§ 423(d)(3) 2 requires a different analysis. Although this part of the statutory definition of disability requires
that the demonstration of the medical condition causing the impairment be "by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,"3 3 the existence of the impairment itself need
not be so proven. That is, although the existence of the medical
condition must be proven by medical evidence, the statutory language does not impose a requirement that the resulting impairment also be proven by such evidence.
In short, the statutory language defines disability as a "functional" rather than a "medical or physical concept. '3 4 That is, disability determinations in particular cases are to be made not
merely with reference to the medical diagnosis of the claimant's
condition, but rather with reference to the effects of the medical
condition on the claimant's ability to work. This emphasis is apparent in, for example, the section of the Social Security Regulation which provides that the presumption of disability which arises
from a normally disabling medical condition may be rebutted by a
showing that the claimant in fact has earnings from work activity
Id.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (1976). See supra note 28.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1976). See supra note 28.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976).
See supra note 28.
Id. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.

34. 2 H.L. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].

§

392 (3d ed. 1983)
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in excess of a certain sum.35 At such a level, earnings are considered by the Secretary to represent an ability to perform "substantial gainful activity"36 within the meaning of the Act, unless the
work was performed in a sheltered or special environment,3 7 or was
otherwise not truly earned by the claimant.3 8
However, most claimants filing for disability benefits are not employed, and therefore, no question exists as to whether their earnings actually represent an ability to perform work activity. For this
reason, most disability determinations involve the consideration of
medical evidence, which will necessarily vary greatly from case to
case. The Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to promulgate regulations to implement the
general requirements of the Act and determine what evidence is
admissible in making disability determinations.3 9 However, these
regulations must be "reasonable" and "not inconsistent with" the
provisions of the Act.4 0 An additional restraint is placed on the
Secretary's discretion by section 205(g) of the Act,4 1 which requires
42
that his findings of fact be "supported by substantial evidence
35. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574 (1983). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 34, at § 392.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1976). The Regulations define substantial gainful activity
generally at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (1983). To be considered "substantial," the work activity
must involve "doing significant physical or mental activities." Id. (a). To be "gainful," it
must be for "pay or profit," or be "the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether
or not a profit is realized." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b) (1983).
37. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(3) (1983).
38. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(2) (1983).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976).
40. Id. Since the statute expressly delegates to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services the power to promulgate regulations as to what constitutes a "disability," the standard for judicial review of the Regulations thus promulgated is that applied in Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1976). In Batterton, ruling upon a similar express delegation of power
by Congress, the Court held that Congress had thereby entrusted "to the Secretary rather
than the courts the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term." Id. at 425.
Therefore, a court could not set aside a Regulation merely because it would have interpreted
the statue differently. Id.
41. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981). This section of the Act also provides
for judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services on an
application for disability insurance benefits by the filing of an action in the federal district
court within sixty days of such final decision. Id.
42. Id. "Substantial evidence" has been defined by the Supreme Court, in one of its
rare reviews of a Social Security disability case, as "more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The substantial evidence standard has been elaborated
upon occasionally by some of the district courts within the Third Circuit and it has been
held that it imposes an obligation on the reviewing courts to review the record as a whole to
determine whether a decision of the Secretary was supported by substantial evidence. Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Baith v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 596
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and provides that if they are so supported, the Secretary's findings
are conclusive as to any reviewing court. 3 The substantial evidence
rule constitutes, however, a separate and distinct basis for judicial
review of the Secretary's final decision. The effect of an incorrect
application of the law by the Secretary is to take the case out of
the substantial evidence standard."
Both of these bases for judicial review may come into play in
cases in which disability is alleged on the basis of subjectively-felt
pain. It is in such cases that the ability of the Social Security Administration to promulgate and apply fair regulations which are
consistent with the statutory mandate, and to reach decisions supported by substantial evidence, is most severely tested. The difficulties inherent in performing the individualized adjudications required in disability cases are greatly compounded when complaints
of chronic, disabling pain must be evaluated, since such complaints
are subjective by nature, and such pain is viewed as unquantifiable
and unmeasurable.4 5 Pain has been described as "the great unknown factor" in disability determinations,4 and as such creates
some of the most intractable issues found in judicial review of such
determinations.
As the party seeking an award of disability insurance benefits,
the claimant bears the initial burden, or risk of non-persuasion, in
proving his disability. Although the Social Security Act does not
(E.D. Pa. 1974). However, if there is "only a slight preponderance of evidence on one side or
another" the Secretary's decision must be affirmed. Szumowski v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp.
1015 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Wilson v. Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981).
44. McCoRMICK, supra note 34, at §§ 392, 730. The improper promulgation or application of a Social Security Regulation which is inconsistent with the Act would, of course,
amount to such an error of law. The relationship between the two types of judicial review is
recognized in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981), which states in part that:
The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Secretary or a decision
rendered under subsection (b) of this section which is adverse to an individual who
was a party to the hearing before the Secretary, because of the failure of the claimant
or such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed
under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations ..
Id.
45. Bolan, Pain as a Disability Claim, SOCIAL SECURrrY FORUM, Feb. 1981, at 4.
46. Id. Bolan recognized that "[aIdministrative law judges are uneasy with pain complaints because pain is subjective, often advanced with weak objective findings, and subject
to exaggeration or abuse." Id. at 5. These are also, of course, the factors which make it
difficult as a matter of policy for the Social Security Administration to make accurate disability determinations in this area; it may perhaps fairly be said that the Administration
itself is "uneasy with pain complaints."
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specifically require that the claimant be made responsible for introducing evidence of his disability, 47 the Regulations 48 indicate
that he must prove to the Social Security Administration or the
state agency that he is disabled4 9 by providing medical 50evidence
showing the existence of an impairment and its severity.
The decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and other
courts also place the burden of proving the existence of a disabling
impairment resulting in an inability to return to his or her previous or customary occupation on the claimant. 1 This showing must
47. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976) merely provides that the Secretary's Regulations are "to
regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proof and evidence and the method of
" Id.
taking and furnishing the same ....
48. Whether a claimant has a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment" within the Social Security Act's definition of a "disability" is determined according
to a five-step evaluation process provided for in the Regulations. This process requires that
each case be evaluated according to a set order of considerations, and if a claimant is found
to be disabled at any point, the case is not reviewed further. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1983).
The questions to be considered under the Regulations are, first, whether the claimant is
presently working. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (1983). Next, it must be determined whether he
has a "severe" impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1983). A "severe" impairment is defined
Id. It must
I..."
as one which "significantly limits . . . ability to do basic work activities .
then be determined whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of the Regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-404.1599 App. 1 (1983), which lists impairments for each of the major body systems which are considered severe enough to prevent a
person from performing any type of work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a) (1983). The listings
include medical findings for each listed impairment, and these findings must be present
before an impairment will be considered to "meet" the listing; a diagnosis of the impairment
is insufficient. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c), (d) (1983). If the medical findings required to support a diagnosis are not included in a particular listing, "the diagnosis must still be established on the basis of medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques."
Id. at (c). "Medical equivalence" to a listed impairment requires a consideration of "symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings," and must be based on "medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (1983). If a claimant is found
disabled under either step (2) or step (3), his age, education, and work experience are not
considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), (d) (1983). Findings are then made as to whether the
impairment prevents the claimant from doing his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(e) (1983). Finally, a determination is made as to whether the claimant can do any
other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1983). This stage is reached if the claimant has met his
burden of proving an inability to return to his past work. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. It involves consideration of the claimant's age, education and work experience
in light of his remaining residual functional capacity under Appendix 2 of the Regulations,
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-404.1599 App. 2 (1983).
49. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 404.1514 (1983).
50. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 404.1514 (1983). Note, however, that the Administration
may pay physicians not employed by it to provide existing medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1514 (1983). Also, if necessary to obtain more detailed or specialized medical evidence,
or to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence already available, the Administration may
have a consultative examination performed at no expense to the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1517 (1983).
51. The Regulations provide that only work experience from within the last 15 years

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 22:491

ordinarily be made by medical evidence, rather than subjective testimony of an inability to work, for a prima facie case of disability
to have been made out.52 Recognizing the special significance of

the opinion of the claimant's regular treating physician,53 the court
in Rossi v. Califano" indicated that a claimant could satisfy this
initial burden of showing an inability to return to customary work
by having her doctor substantiate her subjective claim. 5
Provided that the claimant meets the initial burden of proving
an inability to return to his or her past relevant work, the Third
Circuit has held that the burden then shifts to the Secretary to
demonstrate that the claimant is capable of performing some other
type of substantial gainful activity.56 This holding raises several
questions, including whether the burden which devolves on the
Secretary upon the claimant's introduction of a prima facie case of
disability may properly even be described as a burden of proof,
and whether this burden, if it exists, actually does shift.5 7 In
Dobrowolsky v. Califano,5 a it was seemingly recognized that to so
formulate the issue failed to adequately and clearly define the rewill normally be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 (1983).
52. See, e.g., Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 1981); Livingston v. Califano,
614 F.2d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 1980); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979);
Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1979).
53. See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.
54. 602 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1979).
55. 602 F.2d at 57 (citing Lewis v. Weinberger, 544 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1976); Capaldi v.
Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Pa. 1975)). The court noted that there was no evidence

contradicting the claimant's testimony that she was disabled by fever, nausea, and swelling
of her arm resulting from surgery and radiation therapy for a carcinoma of the breast, and
that her complaints were confirmed by her treating physician, who reported that she was
disabled and that he had advised her not to return to work. 602 F.2d at 56-58.
56. Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1983); Olsen v. Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1983); Torres v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1982); Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d
55 (3d Cir. 1979); Chicager v. Califano, 574 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Rodriguez v.
Schweiker, 523 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Stout v. Schweiker, 514 F. Supp. 1054 (W.D.
Pa. 1981). In at least one case, reversal of a decision denying benefits was required because
the administrative law judge improperly placed the burden of showing an inability to perform any work, as well as her past work, on the claimant. Western v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1204
(5th Cir. 1981).
57. See Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979). In Dobrowolsky, the
court noted that the burden devolving on the Secretary "has been variously described as a
burden of proof, a burden to go forward and produce substantial evidence," a burden "to
show," or simply a burden of production, with no ultimate shifting of the burden of proof.
Id. at 406 (citations omitted). The court ended up "eschew[ing] such discussion as less than
enlightening," since the responsibilities of the parties "resist translation into absolutes, especially because social security proceedings are not strictly adversarial." Id. (citing Miranda
v. Secretary of HEW, 514 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1975)).
58. 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979).
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sponsibility of the Secretary in disability adjudications: to reach a
decision based on substantial evidence as to whether the particular
claimant can perform any type of substantial gainful activity. 9 A
similar recognition is seen in Livingston v. Califano,60 where the
court required the Secretary, once the claimant's initial burden
was met, to establish that there exists alternative substantial gainful employment which is within his ability."'
The Secretary is not, however, required to identify specific jobs
capable of being performed by the disability claimant, as had been
3
previously indicated in Rossi.6 2 Rather, in Santise v. Schweiker,1
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the use of the medicalvocational regulations 64 (commonly referred to as the "grid"6 ")
promulgated by the Secretary in 19786 as an acceptable means of
discharging the Secretary's burden of proof. 7 The medical-vocational regulations take administrative notice of the general availability of jobs which could be performed by a person of the particular claimant's age, education, work experience, and "residual
functional capacity."6 This holding had the effect of overruling
Rossi as to the "specific job" requirement.6 9 The approach of the
court in Santise has since been adopted by the United States Su70
preme Court in Heckler v. Campbell.
59. Id. at 406.
60. 614 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 345.
62. 602 F.2d at 57. The Rossi rule was discussed with approval and reaffirmed as late
as 1982 in Torres v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1982). In Torres, the court conceded
that the statutory language appeared to be neutral as to the burden of proof question, but
the rule was approved as consistent with the recognition that sophisticated information as
to the availability of jobs in the national economy was available to the Secretary, but not to
most claimants. Id. at 111-12. Oddly enough, in discussing the Rossi rule the court failed to
mention its recent decision in Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1982), which had
effectively laid to rest the requirement that the availability of specific alternative jobs be
shown. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
63. 676 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1982).
64. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-404.1599 App. 2 (1983).
65. See, e.g., 676 F.2d at 927.
66. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349 (1978) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-404.1599 App. 2
(1983)).
67. 676 F.2d at 938.
68. "Residual functional capacity" is defined by the Regulations as "what you can still
do despite your [the claimant's] limitation." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (1983).
69. 676 F.2d at 938. The court considered this requirement to be no longer necessary
in light of the new regulations. Id.
70. 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983), rev'g, 665 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1981).
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PROOF OF DISABLING PAIN IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Although allegations of subjectively-felt disabling pain may not
fit comfortably within the Secretary's regulatory scheme, they still
must be dealt with in a large number of cases. In an attempt to
deal with such allegations within the broad requirement of the Social Security Act that disability benefits be granted only to claimants suffering from a "medically determinable physical or mental
impairment," 71 the Secretary has promulgated several Regula-

tions. 2 Generally speaking, these Regulations impose what has
been described as the "'clinical' or 'laboratory' demonstration requirement,

73

which tends to exclude unmeasured, subjectively-felt

pain as a medically determinable impairment.
This requirement can be found in several sections of the Social
Security Regulations. For example, after reciting the statutory definition of a "disability" as an inability to work as the result of a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment," the Regulations add the requirement that the impairment result from "abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

' 75

This language is taken, of

course, from another subsection of the statutory definition of disability, namely 42 U.S.C. § 432(d)(3).7 It means, according to the
Social Security Administration, that although "symptoms" can be
considered, the existence of an impairment as well as of the "abnormality" causing it must be proven by "medical evidence consisting of symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings, not only by
'77
your [the claimant's] statement of symptoms.

71. 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A) (1976). See supra note 28.
72. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
73. See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, at § 412.
74. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (1983) (repeating the language of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A),
quoted supra note 28).
75. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (1983).
76. See supra note 28.
77. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (1983) provides:
What is needed to show an impairment.
If you are not doing substantial gainful activity, we always look first at your physical or mental impairment(s) to determine whether you are disabled or blind. Your
impairment must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques. A physical or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your statement of symptoms. (See § 404.1528 for further information about what we mean by
symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings).
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The difficulty with this Regulation, in terms of its quotation of
this statutory language, is that when a careful comparison with the
Regulation is made, it becomes apparent that it imposes an additional requirement for a proof of a disability, beyond that contemplated in the statute. That is, when read carefully, it is clear that
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) does not require that the impairment itself

be demonstrated with "clinical" and "laboratory" findings. Rather,
such findings are only required to demonstrate the existence of a

medical "abnormality" causing the impairment. 78 From its second

to its third sentence, however, the Regulation leaps from the
clinical and laboratory demonstration requirement which is justified under the Act to one which is not, and requires a claimant to
produce such evidence in the form of "signs, symptoms, and
laboratory findings" as to the impairment as well as its medical
79
cause.
The above-quoted Regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508, then refers
the reader to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 for a further definition of signs,
symptoms, and laboratory findings.8 0 This Regulation illustrates
Id.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34. Nor, it should be noted, does the language of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) provide support for the additional clinical and laboratory
demonstration requirement, by requiring proof of the existence of a "medically determinable... impairment." Id. See supra note 28. Although to this writer's knowledge, the relationship between § 423(d)(1) and § 423(d)(3) has never been analyzed by any court, an
assumption that "medically determinable" is the equivalent of "by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" would seem to be unwarranted absent a plain
indication of legislative intent that the statute should be so construed. The "medically determinable" language would seem to contemplate an acceptance of a wider range of evidence, including, for example, a physician's report based on a familiarity with the claimant's
condition, but not supported by more precise medical evidence such as X-rays or laboratory
tests.
79. See supra note 77.
80. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 (1983) provides:
Symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings.
Medical findings consist of symptoms signs, and laboratory findings:
(a) Symptoms are your own descriptions of your physical or mental impairment. Your statements alone are not enough to establish that there is a physical or mental impairment.
(b) Signs are anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which
can be observed, apart from your statements (symptoms). Signs must be shown
by medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques. Psychiatric signs are
medically demonstrable phenomena which indicate specific abnormalities of
behavior, effect, thought, memory, orientation and contact with reality. They
must also be shown by observable facts that can be medically described and
evaluated.
(c) Laboratoryfindings are anatomical, physiological or psychological phenomena which can be shown by the use of medically acceptable laboratory diagnostic techniques. Some of these diagnostic techniques include chemical tests,
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the extent to which the Social Security Administration has cut
back on the consideration of evidence which might otherwise be
found. probative. All three types of acceptable medical evidence are
included within the caption of "medical findings" which, according
to the preceding Regulation, will be reviewed to determine if there
is support for a physician's conclusion that the claimant is disabled. 81 However, it is clear that "symptoms" (the definition of
which includes pain),s will not be considered sufficient to establish
disability, no matter how severe,"3 unless the existence of the medical condition causing the symptoms is also demonstrated by a review of that medical evidence which is provided through "medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques

' 84

and "medically

acceptable laboratory diagnostic techniques."85
The extent to which the Secretary has sought to exclude subjectively-felt pain from the disability equation is further illustrated
by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. This Regulation indicates that such pain
can serve as the basis of a finding of disability only to the extent
that there is proof of a medical condition "that could be reasonably expected to produce" the pain.86 On its face, this seems a reasonable requirement, because it would appear from the language of
this Regulation that the proof required could include a physician's
report which includes a professional 'opinion that the claimant is
disabled. That is, since under the Regulations the complaint may
be confirmed by "medical signs" 8 7 which are defined as "abnormalelectrophysiological studies (electrocardiogram, electroencephalogram,
roentgenological studies (x-rays), and psychological tests.

etc.),

Id.
81. 20 C.F.R § 404.1527 (1983).
82. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1983). See infra note 86.
83. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(a) (1983). See supra note 80.
84. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(b) (1983). See supra note 80.
85. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(c) (1983). See supra note 80.
86. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1983) provides:
How we evaluate symptoms, including pain.
If you have a physical or mental impairment, you may have symptoms (like pain,
shortness of breath, weakness or nervousness). We consider all your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which signs and laboratory findings confirm these
symptoms. The effects of all symptoms, including severe and prolonged pain, must be
evaluated on the basis of a medically determinable impairment which can be shown
to be the cause of the symptom. We will never find that you are disabled based on
your symptoms, including pain, unless medical signs or findings show that there is a
medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce those symptoms.
Id.

87.

Id.
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ities which can be observed, apart from your statements,"88 one
might imagine that it is medical professionals who are to do the
observing. The definition of "medical findings" would presumably
include professional medical opinions. However, the Secretary has
also promulgated a regulation which seeks to preclude such professional judgment as the basis for establishing a disability, absent a
review of supporting "medical findings" by the Secretary.8 9 Since
medical findings are defined to include "signs" which "can be observed,"' 0 the Secretary's reasoning in promulgating these regulations seems confusing and circular. Surely, the process by which an
independent professional judgment as to what constitutes a medically determinable impairment in a particular case is rendered
91 unless bias on the part
ought not to be unnecessarily restricted,
92
of a particular physician is suspected.
What emerges from an overview of the disability regulations on
pain, therefore, is the realization that the Secretary has sought so
far as possible to exclude the more subjective types of professional
medical evidence from consideration. The effects of this approach
are aggravated by the fact that the regulations also require that
the etiology of a claimant's complaints be definitely established,
despite the intensity of any symptoms as confirmed by a doctor's
professional observations." In other words, the Secretary requires
88. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(b) (1983). See supra note 80.
89. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1983).
90. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(b) (1983). See supra note 80.
91. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(b)-(d) (1983), which defines what medical reports should
include and imposes a requirement of "completeness" which includes "clinical and
laboratory findings." Id. § 404.1513(d). If enforced in cases involving subjective pain as a
disability, where such findings are likely to be absent at least as far as the intensity of the
pain is concerned, this requirement would have the effect of confining even further the Secretary's definition of "medically determinable."
92. Such bias, either for or against a claimant, should not be presumed; the United
States Supreme Court in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), noted that "[wie cannot, and do not, ascribe bias to the work of these independent physicians, or any interest on
their part in the outcome of the administrative proceeding beyond the professional curiosity
a dedicated medical man possesses." Id. at 403.
93. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1983). See supra note 86. This policy was made more explicit
in a recent Social Security Ruling, intended to state the policy of the Social Security Administration on the consideration to be given to symptoms, particularly pain, in the evaluation of disability:
If no medically determinable physical impairment is found, yet the person alleges
work-related limitations due to a symptom normally attributable to a physical impairment, the possibility of a medically determinable severe mental impairment must
be considered. When a medically determinable severe impairment cannot be established on either a physical or mental basis, the claim must be denied, regardless of
the intensity of the symptom, related limitations alleged, or any judgments by exam-
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"objective" proof not just of the cause of subjectively-felt pain, but
also of its intensity, though the latter will be inherently difficult to
produce due to the nature of the impairment. Such an approach to
disability claims will clearly fall most harshly on those claimants
whose subjective complaints are not easily confirmed by the types
of objective evidence demanded by the Secretary.
A.

Reports of Physicians as Proof of a "Medically
Determinable Impairment"

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has responded to the Secretary's policy on proof of disabling pain by holding, along with
other circuits, 9 that a disability claimant's symptomatology, as evidenced either by his doctor's reports or by his subjective complaints, must be considered even if not accompanied by objective
medical data.95 This rule is consistent with the court's holding in
other cases that pain itself can be a disabling condition.9 These
holdings must, however, be read in conjunction with the understanding that subjective testimony of disabling pain standing
alone, will be insufficient to meet a claimant's initial burden of
9 7
proving an inability to return to his past relevant employment.
It is thus clear that the courts will require the serious consideration of all relevant medical evidence at all stages of disability determination proceedings, despite the restrictions of the Social Security Regulations. The decisions demonstrate that this includes
professional medical opinions based on examinations and familiarity with a claimant's condition, even if no "clinical" or "laboratory" findings" are provided with the physician's report. The cases
also indicate that when an administrative law judge arrives at a
finding of "not disabled" by excluding evidence to the contrary
which did not include such findings, the decision will not be considered to have met the substantial evidence test. In such cases,
ining medical sources about the effects of the symptom.
See Social Security Ruling 82-58, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms (PPS-82)
(1982).
94. See supra note 26.
95. See Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1981); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979); Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1979); Bittel v. Richardson,
441 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1971).
96. Smith v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1982); Taybron v. Harris, 667 F.2d 442
(3d Cir. 1981); Smith v. Harris, 644 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d
309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 391 (1975).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
98. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
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the courts have not hesitated to remand the case for a reconsideration of the evidence by the Secretary.
As an example of the requirement that all types of relevant evidence be considered, the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania has long characterized the resolution of
the disability issue as dependent on the results of a two-pronged
test: (1) a determination of the extent of physical or mental disabilities, and (2) a determination as to whether they result in an
inability to perform substantial gainful activity. In making such
determinations, four elements of proof must be considered: (1)
medical data and findings, (2) expert medical opinions, (3) subjective complaints and (4) the claimant's age, education and work experience.99 The requirement that elements (2) and (3) be considered, if not met at the first part of the two-pronged test, would at
least have to be met when the determination of whether an impairment has resulted from the medical condition is made.00 In other
words, the Secretary may not resolve the disability issue by considering only the "objective" evidence in a given case and ignoring
other professional medical evidence. This approach to the disability issue was illustrated by the Third Circuit's discussions of the
02
In both
evidence in Rossi v. Califano'01 and Fowler v. Califano.1
of these cases, denials of disability benefits were reversed by the
Court after a discussion of reports of treating physicians that contained professional opinions, unsupported by "objective findings,"
that the claimants were disabled. In both cases, these reports had
been slighted by the administrative law judges. 03
99. Boyle v. Harris, 506 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Szumowski v. Weinberger, 401
F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Wilson v. Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Baith v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 596 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
100. If one of the elements of proof is slighted, the resulting determination cannot be
said to be supported by substantial evidence, since "[ilf reliance has been placed upon one
portion of the record to the disregard of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the reviewing court must decide against the Secretary." Szumowski v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 1015,
1016 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964)).
101. 602 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1979).
102. 596 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1979).
103. In Rossi, the court quoted the report of Dr. Rice, the claimant's treating physician, who recounted the history of her illness and opined that following her course of radiation treatment for her cancer "she was totally disabled . . . [and] is still disabled." 602 F.2d
at 56-57. The court then noted that "disability may be 'medically determined' . . • even
when a doctor's opinion is not supported by objective clinical findings." Id. at 58 (citing
Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974); Branham v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 614 (6th
Cir. 1967)). In any event, the court concluded that the opinion relied upon by the Secretary
was not "a professional opinion that the applicant 'is capable of working and as to what she
can do.'" 602 F.2d at. 58 (citing Whitson v. Finch, 437 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 1971)). In
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Despite such holdings, however, the extent to which professional
medical opinions are determinative of the disability issue should
not be overstated. To say that this type of evidence must be considered for the determination of the Secretary to be supported by
substantial evidence is not to say that it is dispositive of the
cases. 10 4 Even if the existence of a disease capable of causing the
disabilities at issue is clearly established, this will not end the inquiry; the claimant must also establish that the disease renders
him unable to engage in substantial employment. 0 5 Therefore, although professional opinions of disability must be considered, their
rejection because of a lack of supporting objective medical data has
been upheld in cases in which the reports were characterized as
unsubstantiated, contradictory, and/or conclusory. 0 s
Within these limitations, however, the status of what has been
termed "subjective medical evidence

1 07

is now securely estab-

lished, as far as the reviewing courts are concerned. Although the
Social Security Act requires proof of a medically determinable impairment, this does not mean that symptoms or subjective complaints associated with such an impairment may be ignored when
not substantiated by objective medical evidence. 0 s As one district
court has suggested, to the extent the Social Security Regulations
enact such rules, they are "of dubious legality."'' 09 It is submitted
Fowler the court noted that the opinions of the claimant's treating physician and of her
employer (also a physician), that because of the progress of her multiple sclerosis she had
become disabled were ignored by the administrative law judge, who reached a conclusory
finding that she was not disabled. 596 F.2d at 602. The court found that this result was "not
supported by any medical opinion in this case." Id. at 603.
104. Beasley v. Califano, 608 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1979).
105. Davis v. Califano, 439 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
106. See, e.g., Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981) (opinion that the
claimant was disabled was conclusory and devoid of any support in the way of clinical or
laboratory findings); Kirkland v. Weinberger, 480 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1973) (a physician's unsubstantiated, contradictory, and totally conclusory statement was insufficient to establish
an impairment); Gianella v. Califano, 477 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (claimant's medical
examiners agreed on a diagnosis of coccydynia and low back pain, but there were no objective findings and two of them commented on the claimant's dexterity of motion and lack of
distress).
107. Abel v. Secretary of HEW, 384 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
108. See Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Wiggins v. Schweiker,
679 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1979); Northcutt v.
Califano, 581 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1978); Bittel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1971).
109. Rosario v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 512 F. Supp. 874, 876 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussion of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1980)). The court stated that "[t]he
promulgation of a regulation does not vest with legitimacy a practice that the reviewing
courts have explicitly rejected." 512 F. Supp. at 876 n.2. See supra note 86 for the text of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1983), which is unchanged from the 1980 version despite the admonition
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that, in addition, such a rule would also be inconsistent with the
practicalities of proving a disabling impairment. Not only is "subjective medical evidence" likely to be highly reliable and probative,11 ' but to exclude it would make the rejection of meritorious
disability claims simply too easy, and too likely.'
For these reasons, the judicially imposed rule which admits such evidence is not
only consistent with the Social Security Act's definition of "disability," it is also absolutely necessary to the fair administration of the
Act.
B.

Evaluating the Claimant's Subjective Complaints

In addition to requiring at least a consideration of "subjective
medical evidence" provided by physicians, the Third Circuit has
held that the Secretary must also consider the credibility of a
claimant's complaints of subjective pain and inability to work." 2
This is consistent with the court's realization that pain itself can
be a disabling condition, " ' and that often the exact extent of the
effects of a particular claimant's pain on his ability to work will not
ordinarily be measurable by medical science, even if the medical
condition causing the pain is definitely ascertainable. " The rule is
thus consistent with the necessity or proving that a claimant's imof the court in Rosario.
110. As the court noted in Karp v. Schweiker, 539 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(citing Flake v. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1968)):
Not all subjective complaints of a patient are accepted by a doctor. But one skilled in
the art may well be able, by medically acceptable clinical techniques, to sort them
out, to decide which to believe and to make a diagnosis accordingly. In this case,
several doctors, in spite of a lack of objective symptoms, believed [the claimant's]
complaints and came to a diagnosis on that basis.
Id.
111. This occurred in Timblin v. Harris, 498 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1980), where the
court noted that although two physicians had confirmed that the claimant was disabled and
there was no contrary evidence, "the Secretary classifies medical facts as subjective complaints . . . which the fact-finder may reject." Id. at 1108. The court reversed, and awarded
benefits to the claimant. Id. at 1109.
112. E.g., Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1981); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 391 (1975).
113. E.g., Smith v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1982); Taybron v. Harris, 667 F.2d
412 (3d Cir. 1981); Smith v. Harris, 644 F.2d 985 (3d Cir., 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500
F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 391 (1975).
114. For example, citing the rule that pain itself can be a disabling condition, the
court in one case noted that "[c]omplaints of disabling back pain are among the most difficult types of claims to resolve with any degree of certainty." Taybron v. Harris, 667 F.2d
412, 415 (3d Cir. 1981).
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pairment is "severe"" and that it is not remediable. " It embraces
the common-sense realization that a person with a long employ17
ment history is not likely to suddenly start faking a disability.'
For these reasons, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that an administrative law judge deciding a disability case
must make specific findings on the credibility of a claimant's subjective complaints. " 8 Of course, such complaints may still be rejected by the trier of fact, but only if properly weighed. It has been
held that a proper weighing of a claimant's complaints of disabling
pain entails making an "express finding" as to his credibility." 9
That is, the administrative law judge must "affirmatively address
the issue in his decision."' 2 0 If the claimant's testimony is rejected,
it must be for "reasons consonant with the substantial evidence
test."1 '' A claimant's testimony may not be dismissed as wholly
115. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404,1520(c), 404.1521 (1983).
116. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530 (1983). See also Coleman v. Califano, 462 F. Supp. 77
(N.D.N.Y. 1978) (the court held that the refusal to undergo hernia surgery and attempt
weight reduction meant that the claimant suffered only remediable impairments that could
not serve as the basis for a finding of disability); Locklear v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 639 (D.
Md. 1976) (affirming the finding of the administrative law judge that the claimant's obesity
was remediable, the court denied benefits to the claimant). Compare with Lewis v. Califano,
616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1980) (claimant who refused to undergo surgery to remove tumor because of religious belief in faith healing was entitled to benefits if found disabled).
117. E.g., Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971); Duncan v. Harris, 518 F. Supp.
751 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Nanny v. Mathews, 423 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Va. 1976). The Third
Circuit has recognized that a degree of pain which does not completely incapacitate a person
may still be sufficient to prevent him from meeting the demands of a regular work schedule.
Therefore, the testimony of a claimant with a long work history as to his abilities is entitled
to great weight. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979). In such cases, it has
been held to be error to infer a lack of disabling pain from the claimant's "sporadic activities." Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Tunstall v. Schweiker, 511 F.
Supp. 470, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
118. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979); Kephart v. Richardson, 505
F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1974). Accord Messner v. Califano, 496 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Wolfe v. Califano, 468 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Roberts v. Califano, 439 F. Supp. 188
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Davis v. Califano, 439 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Davila v. Weinberger,
408 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
119. See, e.g., Greth v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (E.D. Pa. 1977), where the
court noted that "[olnly a single opaque paragraph in the ALJ's decision adverts to plaintiff's credibility." Id. at 1271. Furthermore, this paragraph referred as much to the Secretary's requirement that subjective pain be proven by "clinical" and "laboratory" findings as
to the claimant's complaints. Therefore, in the absence of any express finding on the credibility of the claimant's complaints, the court was reluctant to address the merits of the case,
and remanded it instead for appropriate findings of fact. Id. at 1272.
120. Capoferri v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 32, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974); Torrelli v. Weinberger, 423 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
121. Rusnak v. Matthews, 415 F. Supp. 822, 824 (D. Del. 1976). Note that if the Social
Security Administration Appeals Council rejects the credibility findings of an administrative
law judge and overturns his decision granting benefits, it is under the same obligation to
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self-serving simply because it is subjective, 1 22 although it has also
been stated that the testimony must be evaluated with due consideration for the claimant's motivation. 123 In fact, the administrative
law judge may be said to be under a duty to evaluate the claimant's subjective complaints in light of the objective medical evidence and other evidence which is available,2 and may reject
complaints which are "grossly disproportionate" to such evidence. 2 5 However, if there is no medical evidence in the record to
support a finding that claimant's subjective complaints are not
credible, reversal or remand is required. 26
In addition to the Social Security Regulations which require that
subjective complaints be supported by "clinical" or "laboratory"
findings, 2 7 the decisions of the Third Circuit and other courts have
had to deal with several other rationales purporting to justify refusals to properly weigh such evidence. One such rationale for the
discounting of both the medical evidence presented by a claimant
and his subjective complaints is that the claimant's appearance
does not conform to the administrative law judge's idea of what a
person suffering from the particular medical conditions alleged
should look like. This approach to the disability issue was firmly
rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Kelly v. Railroad
28
Retirement Board.1
In that case, in regard to professional psychiatric evidence submitted by a claimant seeking a disabled child's
annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, the court stated that
such evidence could not be rejected merely upon an administrative
law judge's lay observation that the claimant appeared to be an
ordinary, normal individual. 29 This holding was consistent with
make express findings. Beavers v. Secretary of HEW, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978).
However, if the Appeals Council only summarily affirms the administrative law judge's decision, the reviewing court will assume that all matters of record were fully considered. Carlin
v. Secretary of HEW, 448 F. Supp. 34 (D. Kan. 1978).
122. Stuart v. Califano, 443 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
123. Crump v. Califano, 452 F. Supp. 848 (D. Kan. 1978).
124. Rusnak v. Matthews, 415 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1976); Anderson v. Richardson,
352 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
125. E.g., Baith v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 596, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
126. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1981); Miller v. Harris, 490 F. Supp. 1184
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
127. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 404.1528, 404.1529 (1983). See supra notes 77, 80, 86.
128. 625 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1980).
129. 625 F.2d at 494 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir.
1980); Gober v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1978)). The court noted that five psychiatrists had classified the claimant as having depressive neurosis and one psychologist had
diagnosed her as having a "hysterical personality." 625 F.2d at 494. Of course, when a psychological disability is alleged, the observation of an administrative law judge that the

512

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 22:491

the fact that the administrative law judge, though entitled and indeed required to assess credibility, 30 is outside his realm of expertise when he attempts to make a medical judgment based on the
physical appearance of a claimant. For this reason, the Third Circuit has held on numerous occasions that he may not "set his own
expertise against that of a physician who testified before him," ''
32
or who otherwise presents competent medical evidence.1
Other courts have confirmed and followed these holdings. Although the administrative law judge may rely on demeanor evidence and his own impressions and observations derived therefrom, s he may not discard the other evidence presented on the
basis that the claimant's appearance did not present "observable
phenomena" thought to be associated with complaints of disabling
pain, such as significant muscle atrophy or weight loss. 34 Such assessments of a claimant's pain have been rejected on the basis that
the proposition that such "observable phenomena" should exist is
not self-evident for all pain in every organ, and was not established
on the record by expert testimony. 3 5 Such "sit and squirm" jurisprudence136 has even been carried to the point that an administrative law judge has improperly conducted an amateur vision test of
an allegedly vision-impaired claimant by having her read a photostatic copy, resulting in the remand of the case.'s'
C.

Obligations of the Administrative Law Judge

In addition to failures to properly consider the credibility of a
claimant did not appear to be in pain at his hearing will ordinarily be entitled to little or no
weight. Lewis v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1976).
130. See supra notes 118-126 and accompanying text.
131. Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1978).
132. Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1980); Golofsky v. Califano, 607
F.2d 1063, 1068 (3d Cir. 1979); Fowler v. Califano, 596 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1979). In
Lewis, for example, the court held that the administrative law judge could not determine
from the claimant's appearance alone, in light of the medical evidence to the contrary, that
she was not disabled by a uterine tumor which one physician described as larger than a fullterm fetus. 616 F.2d at 76-77.
133. Bibbs, Secretary of HEW, 626 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1980); Torres v. Harris, 494 F.
Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Good v. Weinberger, 389 F. Supp. 350 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Crooks v.
Ribicoff, 202 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
134. King v. Secretary of HEW, 481 F. Supp. 947, 948-49 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
135. Id. at 949.
136. E.g., Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727 (11th Cir. 1982) (the administrative law
judge subjectively arrived at an index of traits which he expected a claimant alleging constant pain to exhibit, and then denied the claim when he failed to observe them in the
claimant).
137. Gudlis v. Califano, 452 F. Supp. 401 (N.D.Ill. 1978).
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claimant's subjective complaints, and properly weigh the medical
evidence, administrative law judges have sometimes failed to meet
other judicially imposed requirements in rendering their decisions.
For example, decisions of administrative law judges have had to be
reversed in literally hundreds of cases due to gross misinterpretations of medical reports, reliance on isolated statements taken out
of context, failure to state explicit reasons for disregarding the
claimant's medical evidence or testimony, or reaching a finding of
non-disability in the face of unrebutted evidence to the contrary. A
particular issue as to which there has been considerable controversy is the relative weight to be given the opinion of a regular
treating physician, as opposed to one who performs a single consultative exam, or who does not examine the claimant at all.
Based on its review of disability cases where an administrative
law judge's opinion exhibited some or all of these vices, the Third
Circuit has in several cases discussed the standards expected of
disability decisions on judicial review. The court has held that decisions of administrative law judges must be as "comprehensive
and analytical"" 8 as feasible, revealing what evidence was accepted
140
and what was rejected. 3 9 In Baerga v. Richardson,
for example,
although the court of appeals affirmed a denial of benefits on other
grounds, it expressed concern over the manner in which the administrative law judge set forth his decision. In his decision, the
judge merely summarized the evidence,14 ' and then set forth an
"evaluation of the evidence" in which the claimant's complaints
were rejected in a conclusory manner," 2 without reference to his
138. Smith v. Harris, 644 F.2d 985, 989 (3d Cir. 1981); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
139. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975). The court in Baerga noted that although
the administrative law judge as fact-finder may reject evidence as not credible, "failure to
indicate rejection could lead to a conclusion that he neglected to consider it at all." 500 F.2d
at 312. See also Goodley v. Harris, 608 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1979); Belmen v. Califano,
588 F.2d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1978) (administrative law judge may not "arbitrarily choose to
ignore an uncontroverted medical diagnosis").
140. 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
141. Id. at 312. The court noted that: "The examiner merely extracted portions of the
medical reports which he stated '. . . are of interest.' Consequently, the summary serves no
purpose except for identifying portions of the evidence; there is absolutely no attempt to
analyze or evaluate those items referred to in the summary." Id. at 312 n.3.
142. Id. at 312. The substitution of "conclusory" statements and assertions for a reasoned analysis was the basis for reversal of a finding of non-disability in Fowler v. Califano,
596 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1979); Milazza v. Schweiker, 528 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
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subjective complaints or to some of the medical reports which
strongly supported the claim. This supporting evidence included xray studies revealing degenerative joint disease and reports of
treating physicians confirming functional losses in the claimant's
spine and some of his joints. 4 '
The obvious reason for the requirement that disability determinations include full and explicit findings is so that a reviewing
court will be able to discern the basis of the decision.14 4 The court
will not speculate as to an administrative law judge's reasoning
process.1 45 It is only when the reasoning behind a disability decision is revealed that the court can determine whether the decision
was supported by substantial evidence. Within that standard, reversals of decisions denying benefits have been required for various
other reasons.
As might be expected, one of the most common causes for such
reversals is a failure by the administrative law judge to adequately
consider and discuss the subjective complaints of the claimant, and
the testimony relating thereto. In this regard, the decision must
include findings on the credibility of the claimant's testimony, 46
and benefits must be granted if there is no basis in the record for a
finding on this issue.14 7 The administrative law judge must state
reasons for the credibility choices made; he must explicitly state
whether he believed or disbelieved the claimant. 48 Various courts
have also found fault with certain practices of administrative law
judges in weighing medical reports. There have been reversals of
decisions denying benefits for reliance on a portion of a report
when a fair reading of the entire report did not support the decision, 14 for excessive reliance on a "rather cursory" report in the
143. 500 F.2d at 312 n.4.
144. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979); Hargenrader v. Califano,
575 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1978); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 931 (1975); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1981). As was stated
in Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981): "Since it is apparent that the AJ cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason . . . an explanation from the ALJ of
the reason why probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court
can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper." Id. at 706-07 (citation
omitted).
145. Schaaf v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1978).
146. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979); Kephart v. Richardson,
505 F.2d 1085, 1089 (3d Cir. 1974).
147. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1981); Davila v. Weinberger, 408 F.
Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Wilson v. Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
148. Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1981); Saldana v. Weinberger, 421
F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Selewich v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 191 (D. Mass. 1969).
149. Hassler v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1974).
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face of contrary evidence,' 50 and for basing a decision on a single
report in the face of several others indicating that the claimant was
disabled. 151 One district court has provided a laundry list of reasons for remand in a disability case. These include reliance on
equivocal or contradictory evidence not sufficient to meet the substantial evidence test, the absence of specific testimony from the
record, a failure to make findings of fact reflecting a proper allocation of the burden of proof, and basing findings on medical records
16 2
which defy comprehension because of illegibility.
Perhaps the most common failure of administrative law judges
inweighing medical evidence is an excessive reliance on the reports
of physicians who have performed a single consultative examination of the claimant for the Social Security Administration, 1 as or
who have not examined him at all.' 5 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has held, in Cotter v. Harris,5 that in comparison to such
sources, the opinion of a claimant's regular treating physician is
entitled to "substantial weight.' 6 This holding has also been
reached by a large number of other courts.15 It has even been held
150. Tunstall v. Schweiker, 511 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
151. Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 625 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1983), where the court, after reciting the substantial evidence test as found in Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981), pointed out that:
This oft-cited language is not, however, a talismanic or self-executing formula for
adjudication; rather, our decisions make clear that determination of the existence vel
non of substantial evidence is not merely a quantitative exercise. A single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to
resolve a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it
is overwhelmed by other evidence-particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that
offered by treating physicians)-or if it really constitutes not evidence but merely
conclusion. . . . The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise
without which our review of social security disability cases ceases to be merely differential and becomes instead a sham.
710 F.2d at 114 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
152. Fields v. Harris, 498 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
153. The use of written reports from physicians who have performed consultative examinations was approved in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), and is provided
for at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517-404.1518 (1983).
154. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546 provides for the use of state agency staff physicians or other
physicians designated by the Secretary to provide assessments of a claimant's residual functional capacity, based on the reports of "treating or examining physicians, consultative physicians, or any other physician designated by the Secretary." Id.
155. 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
156. 642 F.2d at 704 (citing Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978)). The
court noted that the administrative law judge did not even mention the report of Dr.
Corcino, the claimant's treating physician, or his opinion that that claimant could not return to work. Instead, he preferred to rely on the contrary opinion of Dr. Trinidad, who had
performed only a single consultative examination. 642 F.2d at 704.
157. E.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982); Carver v. Harris, 634
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that this rule applies notwithstanding that the treating physician
did not treat the claimant until after the relevant determination
date. 158 In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the rule prevails
that when no contrary evidence is presented, the treating physician's expert opinion is binding as to whether a disabling impairment exists.1" A few courts have held that when the only evidence
presenting an opinion contrary to those that the claimant is disabled is presented by a non-examining physician, such evidence
cannot even constitute "substantial evidence."' 10 Although the
rules of these latter cases represent an extreme position, it is clear
that the rule that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to
the greatest weight has been largely accepted. Certainly, a consultant's advisory report is not conclusive, simply because it was ordered by a state agency or by the Secretary. 6 '
The Social Security Administration, however, continues to
downplay the importance of the opinions of treating physicians, as
evidenced by the promulgation of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, which attempts to minimize the effect to be given a statement by such a
62
physician that a claimant is "disabled" or "unable to work.'
This policy was recently reaffirmed in a memorandum to all administrative law judges from the Administration's Office of Hearings and Appeals.' 5 This memorandum reviewed "problems" revealed by the ongoing "Bellmon Review" program provided for in
the 1980 amendments to the Social Security Act. 6 4 It indicated
F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1980); Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Harris,
497 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1980); McDaniel v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
Contra Sitar v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1982) (a treating physician's opinion is not
necessarily entitled to greater weight than that of a physician who examines the claimant
only once).
158. Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1983); Dousewicz v. Harris, 646 F.2d
771 (2d Cir. 1981); Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974).
159. See, e.g., Eiden v. Secretary of HEW, 616 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1980); Alvarado v.
Califano, 605 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979).
160. Karp v. Schweiker, 539 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Gudlis v. Califano, 452 F.
Supp. 401 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Contra Janka v. Secretary of HEW, 589 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1978).
161. Smith v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1982). See also Woodard v. Schweiker,
668 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1981), where it was held to be improper for an administrative law
judge to agree to be "bound" by a non-examining medical advisor's opinion as to whether
the claimant was "impaired," and to reject her claim upon the response that she was not. Id.
at 373.
162. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1983). See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
163. SocIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, Subject: Results of and Problem Areas Disclosed by the Ongoing Bellmon Review (April 29, 1982), reprinted in Social Security Forum, July 1982, at 15 [hereinafter cited as Results of Beilmon
Review].
164. In addition to the other changes in the management of the disability program
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that in claimant-favorable disability determinations, there "appears to be a tendency to accord undue weight" to the opinions of
treating physicians, as well as to the testimony of the claimant's
themselves. 16 5 The memorandum clearly reveals that although the
Administration is aware of the judicial holdings on these issues, it
intends not to follow them, and to limit their effects as much as
possible.
IV.

THE "POLICY OF NON-ACQUIESCENCE"

A case may be made out for the proposition that much of the
tension between the policies of the Social Security Administration
and the decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and other
courts is inevitable, as the natural result of the difference in institutional perspectives. 61 However, of late this difference has been
unnecessarily aggravated by the Secretary's refusal to attempt to
accommodate the judicial interpretations of the Social Security
Act within the disability adjudication process. Instead, the Secretary has embarked on a "policy of non-acquiescence" as to court
decisions which are inconsistent with the Social Security Regulations and other expressions of policy, refusing to give these decisions any effect in disability determinations. This policy of nonacquiescence has especially affected claimants who have alleged a
disabling degree of subjectively-felt pain.
The policy of non-acquiescence is not merely some vaguely discernible trend; rather, it is an announced policy which the Social
Security Administration expects its personnel to consistently apply. 167 It is defined in the OHA Handbook, which is made available
to personnel of the Administration's Office of Hearings and Appeals who are responsible for conducting hearings and reviews of
disability claims.168 Under the non-acquiescence policy, administrative law judges and other personnel are informed that the Secretary is bound only by the decisions of the United States Supreme
discussed supra note 12 § 304(g) of PUB. L. No. 96-265 provided that: "[tihe Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall implement a program of reviewing, on his own motion,
decisions rendered by administrative law judges as a result of hearing under section 221(d)
of the Social Security Act, and shall report to the Congress by January 1, 1982, on his
progress." Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, PUB. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94
Stat. 456 (appears in notes following 42 U.S.C. § 421 (Supp. V 1981)).
165. Results of Bellmon Review, supra note 163, at 15.
166. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
167.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALsi OHA Hand-

book § 1-161 (T.S. No. 1-9, issued 12/79) [hereinafter cited as OHA Handbook].
168. OHA Handbook, supra note 167, at § 1-110 (T.S. No. 1-31, issued 6/81).
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Court, and not by the decisions of federal district and appeals
courts.'6 9 When a decision of a lower federal court is inconsistent
with the Secretary's interpretation of the Social Security Act or
Regulations, such a decision is not to be considered binding in
other than the particular case it decides. This applies even as to
decisions which are not appealed by the Secretary. 17 0
This policy of non-acquiescence greatly complicates the task of
securing disability benefits for claimants who are lawfully entitled
to them, especially when benefits are sought on the basis of subjectively-felt disabling pain, since there is such a disparity between
the Secretary's policy and the judicial decisions on that issue. The
result is the creation of dual standards for the determination of
disability issues: one standard for claimants who appeal denials or
terminations of benefits to the courts, where the judicially evolved
standards apply, and another, more restrictive, standard for those
*who give up at the administrative level.17 ' In addition, administrative law judges charged with rendering disability determinations
are placed, unnecessarily, in a crossfire between the inconsistent
standards of adjudication imposed by their superiors and by the
courts. 17 The final result of the non-acquiescence policy is that
more applications are wrongfully denied than would otherwise be
the case, and it is more often necessary to seek judicial review of
the Secretary's determinations. More benefit dollars end up in the
hands of attorneys, as contingent fees. Nonetheless, the policy continues to be defended by the Secretary, who has contended that
73
the "case law" supports it.1
169. OHA Handbook, supra note 167, at § 1-161 (T.S. No. 1-9, issued 12/79). The
Social Security Administration may decide to acquiesce in a particular district or circuit
court decision however, and issue an appropriate regulation or ruling. Id. This writer knows
of no instance in which it has done so concerning the issues discussed in this comment.
170. Id. The OHA Handbook indicates that "fin certain cases SSA will not appeal a
court decision it disagrees with, in view of special circumstances of the particular case (e.g.,
the limited effect of the decision)." Id.
171. Policy of Acquiescence Bombarded, SOCIAL SECURrrY FORUM, July 1983, at 1,
where the progress of two current attacks on the non-acquiescence policy is reported. These
are: Lopez v. Heckler, No. 8'3-0697-WPG(T) (C.D. Cal. June 16, 1983) (preliminary injunction issued preventing the application of the non-acquiescence policy to cessation cases
within the Ninth Circuit); See Morrison v. Heckler, No. C83-888V (W.D. Wash. May 7,
1983) (preliminary injunction issued requiring that all disability decisions concerning a previously certified class of disability benefits claimants who are Washington residents be made
in accordance with four Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions). SOCIAL SECURITY FORUM,
supra, at 3-4.
172. These invasions of the independent decision-making powers of administrative law
judges have also been the subject of litigation. See supra note 18.
173. The Secretary has instructed administrative law judges that:
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This argument is, however, a distortion of the truth. In several
cases involving the National Labor Relations Board, it has been
held that the Board was not free to pursue its own policy of nonacquiescence and refuse to follow prior decisions of courts of appeals. The more persuasive approach is that such decisions, if not
overruled by the United States Supreme Court, are binding on inferior courts, litigants, and administrative agencies.' 7 4 The same
result was reached in a recent case 175 involving the reversal by the
Appeals Council of a claimant-favorable decision of an administrative law judge in a Social Security proceeding. In his decision, the
administrative law judge had noted that under the relevant case
law, 176 subjective complaints had to be considered even if unsupported by objective findings. 77 This reference was the basis of the
reversal by the Appeals Council. 7 8 Although it determined that

the Appeals Council's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the court noted that the Social Security Administration was
bound to follow decisions of the court of appeals unless or until
they were reversed by the Supreme Court. 179 Despite such statements, however, it seems unlikely that the non-acquiescence policy
will be abandoned unless reform legislation is enacted.8 0
I wouTd like to remind you that the Secretary's regulations are legislative rules and
have the full force and affect [sic] of the law. Accordingly, you are bound by the
Secretary's regulations and the agency's interpretation of the same. It is well established by case law that an agency's interpretations of its own regulations are controlling on the agency's adjudicators and the courts .
Results of Bellmon Review, supra note 163, at 16.
174. NLRB v. Blackstone Co., 685 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1982); Ithaca College v. NLRB,
623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Allegheny General Hospital v.
NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979). In the Blackstone case, the court responded to a contrary argument that it regarded the Board's instructions to its administrative law judges on
non-acquiescence "to be completely improper and reflective of a bureaucratic arrogance
which will not be tolerated." 685 F.2d at 106 n.5.
175. Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
176. Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1980).
177. 547 F. Supp. at 89-90.
178. Id. at 90. In regard to the reversal of an administrative law judge's decision as to
credibility by the Appeals Council, it should be noted that the administrative law judge is
not only required by the case law to make findings on this issue, but he is also in a much
better position to do so than the Appeals Council, since he is the one to actually observe the
claimant.
179. 547 F. Supp. at 92. The court quoted the Ithaca College case: "The Board cites
no contrary authority [to the relevant case law] except its own consistent practice of refusing to follow the law of the circuit unless it coincides with the Board's views. This is intolerable if the rule of law is to prevail." Id. (quoting Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980)).
180. Such legislation is pending; see S. 476, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc.
S1146-52. The bill would require that the Secretary of Health and Human Services appeal
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CONCLUSION

Even without difficulties such as those imposed by the Secretary's policy of non-acquiescence, the resolution of such an individualized issue of whether a particular person is disabled by subjectively-felt pain is likely to create tension in a mass-adjudication
system like that run by the Social Security Administration, and
make fair and uniform determinations difficult to achieve. 18 1 Legislation which imposes specific requirements that subjective testimony of a claimant in regard to his allegedly disabling pain be considered' 82 may be helpful. However, in light of the highly
individualized determinations inherently required in a process by
which a broad and general legislative standard is supposed to be
applied in widely differing fact situations, it seems clear that legislation is only part of the answer. What is also required is a willingness on the part of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
which is to say the Social Security Administration, to submit to
the rule of law and be governed by the relevant case law like any
other litigant. The Secretary might even consider trying to conform the Social Security Regulations to developments in the case
law, instead of attempting to nullify unwelcome judicial decisions
by the promulgation of Regulations"'3 or other means. Unfortunately, however, such a change of policy presently seems unlikely.
The Administration's policy of non-acquiescence, and its refusal to
even attempt to accommodate judicial holdings through the promulgation of new regulations not inconsistent with them, further
complicates the disability adjudication process. The final result is
the frustration of the purpose of the disability program: to provide
for the disabled worker.
George R. Zaiser

any decision of a circuit court of appeals to which it has chosen not to acquiesce. Id. § 9.
The bill would also amend the Social Security Act to define "pain." Although subjective
testimony would not be conclusive evidence of disability, it would have to be considered as
to "the intensity and persistence of such pain or other symptoms" once the existence of "a
medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain" is shown through
"clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. at § 8(a).
181. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 180.
183. See supra note 109 and accompanying text, for an example of how one court
dealt with such an attempt.

